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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the role of violence in Iraq in establishing the current Iraqi state. My
chapters provide historical and theoretical context to the subject before getting into the analysis.
The goal of this thesis is to show that violence in Iraq is not only caused by sectarian differences,
but has been used and influenced by leaders, outside governments, and non-state institutions for
personal gain and political goals at the cost of the Iraqi people.
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Introduction
Background/Research Question:
In order to understand Iraq today, it is important to look back on its history and the major
role that violence has played in the formation of the state. Throughout history, and in more recent
events such as the United Nations sanctions in the 1990s, Saddam Hussein’s Return to Faith
Campaign, and the actions of Iraqi media, the state of Iraq and its people have been subjected to
extreme violence. Violence in Iraq continually delegitimizes the government, weakens the
economy, and warps the ability to have an Iraqi national identity.
The actions of internal and external powers have created violence and greatly influenced
its role in the country. Iraq’s problems have been attributed to sectarian divisions for a long time.
While these divisions have contributed to the current state, this is an oversimplified argument.
Violence will continue to shape Iraq until the international community understands that the
problem is not due sectarian divides, and the Iraqi government gains public confidence through
legitimate, internal reforms.
Exploring socioeconomic tensions, religious identities, the media, and global issues that
affect the country such as international power dynamics and the effects of orientalism through
the lens of violence will shed new light on problems and solutions regarding the Iraqi state. As I
dive into each chapter’s event, I hope to show how different types of violence in Iraq are
intrinsically intertwined with the state and non-state institutions and how it has affected the
country and the government’s legitimacy. In addition to this, I will explore how Iraq’s challenges
are deeper than sectarianism.
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Data and Methodology:
In order to research this question, I mainly used qualitative methods of research. For
primary sources, I found previously conducted interviews with government officials and Iraqi
citizens. I used these to better understand the public’s feelings towards different events. It helped
me gain a better perspective on the problems facing Iraq, rather than just looking at them from
the outside, American lens. Additionally, I read books and news reports written by Iraqis who
lived through the specific events that I researched along with official government documents.
These also contributed to having a less Americanized view of things. For my secondary sources
I referenced many books, articles from academic journals, and credible news reports from other
countries. By reading theoretical discussions on violence, I better framed my research around the
current ideas of violence that are discussed in academia. I searched for biographies of Saddam
Hussein to better understand his policies and way of governing. This helped me form my own
opinions about his rule and reasoning so that I could apply the knowledge to the bigger picture of
Iraq’s problems. For my quantitative sources, I looked at official statistics from governments and
NGOs for data on child mortality rates, rates of inflation and unemployment, and the religious
and ethnic makeup of Iraq. I used this information as concrete evidence of the negative effects of
the events I covered. This mixture of sources and methods greatly increased the credibility of my
research by basing my findings and analysis on facts.
Challenges:
Although Iraq continually feels the effects of sectarian division and its impact on daily
life, I wanted to make sure that I did not look at everything through a sectarian lens or orientalist
lens. This is because one of my main goals of this thesis was to prove that Iraq’s problem with
violence stems from more than just sectarian divisions. Additionally, too often academic work
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from Western researchers on these topics is created with a sectarian lens. As a student studying
the Middle East, I wanted to do my due diligence of avoiding this cliched analysis in order to
accurately and respectfully conduct my research. This was a difficult responsibility, but I wanted
to undertake it because it could negatively influence my research by generalizing and blaming all
of Iraq’s problems on its sectarian divides, which is not factual.
It was also important to not assume that insurgent violence was the primary cause of
insecurity and all other forms of security would follow its resolution, which is why I am not
focusing greatly on Islamic State or al-Qaeda. With that assumption, I would overlook the roles
that legitimate governments play in carrying out violence.
Additionally, I purposely did not discuss the violence that the Kurds, Yazidis, and other
minority groups in Iraq have been subjected to. I chose to do this because while each group has
been exposed to so much violence, I could not cover it all in full in this undergraduate thesis.
Their experiences still very much matter and contribute to the current state of Iraq. If I ever
expand on this research, I would like to do it in a way that includes these groups.
Definitions:
A common factor throughout almost every academic source that theoretically discusses
violence is the concept of “us versus them.” This notion is presented in a variety of ways, but the
theoretical reasoning for violence is almost always referred back to it. Along with this, violence
is usually divided and studied in three categories that were originally defined by Johan Galtung.
The categories are personal (direct), structural (indirect), and cultural (symbolic). The types of
violence exist in a flow relationship. While they can exist on their own, most of the time they
form a causal flow from cultural via structural to direct violence.1

1

Galtung, Johan. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No. 3. (Aug., 1990), pp. 291-305.
https://www.galtung-institut.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Cultural-Violence-Galtung.pdf

8

The types of violence that I cover are political, economic, religious, and cultural. Each
of these come with direct, indirect, and symbolic characteristics. With these, I hope to show that
violence is not just a physical action, but a way to systematically control and oppress a
population by state and non-state actors. While researching and analyzing violence, there are two
problems to look at: the use of violence and the legitimation of that use.
Christina Perez defines political violence as a type of violence aimed to get political
influence that is motivated to seek power or to maintain its prevalent structures.2 Here, the notion
of political violence will be understood as the violence directly and purposefully administered in
the name of a political ideology, movement, or state. This can be the physical repression of
dissent by the state or outside government as well as its converse, which is the popular armed
struggle against a repressive regime.
Nitasha Kaul’s definition of economic violence states that it is “not only the violence
caused for economic reasons, but also the violence caused by spurious economics. It is the
violence caused to people when they lose their jobs and livelihoods, when they witness
massively divergent rewards for work, when they see an endless perpetuation of inequality
around them.3” She argues that such involuntary unemployment in the long run leads to social
breakdown and community fragmentation. Katharina Kezstyus explains further in saying that
violence caused for economic reasons can evolve when, for example, people protest or riot
against a scarcity of resources which subsequently poses threats of security to the state. On the
other hand, violence caused by inherent economic structures is referring to the harm that is done
to people who have to bear unjust structural inequalities of wages, income, resources, or
2

Perez, Cristina Gonzalez. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework. Institut Barcelona D'Estudis Internacionals
(IBEI), 2011, pp. 5–8, Political Violence and Inequality in Latin America During The Cold War,
www.jstor.org/stable/resrep14213.7.
3
Kaul, Nitasha. “The Economics of Turning People into Things.” OpenDemocracy, 20 Apr. 2009,
www.opendemocracy.net/en/the-economics-of-turning-people-into-things/.
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opportunities.4 The UN Sanctions implemented on Iraq were the cause of more than a decade of
economic violence.
There are many parts at play in religious violence besides just religion, they include
cultural practices, group dynamics, and human emotions. This can be acts of violence committed
by religious groups or towards religious groups. In the context of this paper, religion is used by
Saddam Hussein to manipulate Iraqis into submission to the state. Here, I looked at religious
violence as a subcategory of cultural violence.
Galtung defines cultural violence as any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize
violence in its direct or structural form. Furthermore, symbolic violence built into a culture does
not kill or maim like direct violence or the violence built into the structure. However, it is used to
legitimize either or both.5 Cultural violence in Iraq was and continues to be implemented by the
media. Examples of cultural violence are indicated using a division of culture into religion and
ideology, art and language, and empirical and formal science.6 My research is mostly based
around the religion and ideology flowing into art and language.
The study of cultural violence highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and
the fact of structural violence are legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society.7 Media
violence encapsules the portrayal of violence in the media and violence incited by the media
through polarized content, inflamed language, and political affiliations. Iraq’s media has played a
major role in inciting violence in the post-war state.

4

Kesztyus, Katharina. “The Contemporary Neoliberal State and Economic Violence.” E-International Relations, 31
May 2018, www.e-ir.info/2018/05/31/the-contemporary-neoliberal-state-and-economic-violence/.
5
Galtung, Johan. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No. 3. (Aug., 1990), pp. 291-305.
https://www.galtung-institut.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Cultural-Violence-Galtung.pdf
6
Galtung, Johan. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No. 3. (Aug., 1990), pp. 291-305.
https://www.galtung-institut.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Cultural-Violence-Galtung.pdf
7
Galtung, Johan. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No. 3. (Aug., 1990), pp. 291-305.
https://www.galtung-institut.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Cultural-Violence-Galtung.pdf
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Additionally, I think the sanctions, Saddam Hussein’s handling of them, and the world’s
disregard to the suffering also resulted in cultural violence. By drawing out the chain of effects,
the actor(s) avoids facing the violence directly. Galtung has also explored the ideas of
segmentation, marginalization, and fragmentation. Simply, segmentation is when the underdog
has only a partial idea of what is happening. Marginalization keeps the underdogs on the outside,
while fragmentation keeps the underdogs away from each other. The marginalization that
occured between Iraqis and the ruling elite during this time resulted in extreme hardship
experienced by the public compared to the leaders that were hoarding resources and using them
for their benefit. While Iraq experienced this side of segmentation, I do not believe that the
public experienced fragmentation. In my chapter on economic sanctions, I argue this by showing
that the shared suffering created a common goal to just survive.

Overview of Chapters:
I used chapter 1 to discuss my research question and challenges, lay out my data and
methodology and define terms. I structured it this way to help the reader better understand the
organization before getting into the reading. In chapter 2, I review Iraq’s history and the role of
violence in the creation of the state. I chose to begin with this background because I wanted to
show that violence has played an integral part throughout each era of Iraq’s history. By exploring
Iraq through colonialism, pro and anti-British rulers, uprisings, the Pan-Arab movement, coups,
World Wars, Ba’athism, and Saddam’s rise to power, I wanted to gain a better understanding of
its history before analyzing more recent events. This is also where the significance of my
research comes into play. By combining a historical analysis along with more recent violent
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events, I am able to look at Iraq’s statehood through a different lens than just colonialism or
sectarianism.
In chapter 3, I cover the sanctions placed on Iraq by the United Nations after the Gulf
War in 1990. These sanctions set the precedent for a decade, or longer, of economic turmoil and
socioeconomic tensions. The sanctions devastated the Iraqi people and economy and brought
into question the legitimacy of the state government. Iraq is still trying to recover from the severe
economic and political violence that the sanctions caused.
Chapter 4 looks at Saddam Hussein’s Return to Faith Campaign. This campaign came
about in the middle of the sanctions in the 1990s. Through this, Saddam was trying to satisfy
economic, pragmatic, and strategic goals. He thought that pushing the idea of faith, politicizing
religion, and godify-ing himself would turn people to demonize and blame the West, instead of
his government. He also aimed to appeal to clerics in order to suppress any possible rebellions
and use mosques for intelligence gatherings. While the West is to blame for a lot of the
devastation on Iraq, Saddam was not without fault. This campaign used and incited religious and
political violence, and created a fertile ground for extremist ideals. Additionally, it increased the
sectarian divide between Iraqis in a time when the country could have benefited from their unity.
Finally, in chapter 5, I explore the violence incited by the media in post-war Iraq. The
media has contributed to the exacerbation of violence through its politicalization, polarized
content, and the psychological effect it has on people. The media has affected the way that Iraqis
think about their government, how the outside world sees Iraq, and continues the narration of
sectarian division. Continued violence by the media will cause just as much devastation to the
state as political and economic violence do. The effect is detrimental to a post-war society.
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Chapter 2: Historic Background
When the Ottoman Empire fell after the First World War, a secret agreement between
Great Britain and France decided the fates of present day Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan
and Palestine. British Diplomat Sir Mark Sykes and French Lawyer François Georges-Picot were
the chief negotiators in the talks that began in November 1915. The negotiations led to the
Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916. Through this, Great Britain acquired southern Mesopotamia,
including Baghdad, and the Mediterranean ports of Haifa and Akko. France acquired Syria and
Lebanon. Additionally, they agreed that between the French and the British acquisitions there
should be a confederation of Arab states or a single independent Arab state, divided into French
and British spheres of influence.8
As the agreement conflicted with the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence of 1915, which
was a series of letters exchanged between Hussein Ibn Ali, Emir of Mecca, and Sir Henry
McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, the Arab people were outraged. The
correspondence effectively traded British support of an independent Arab state for Arab
assistance in opposing the Ottoman Empire. This outrage and call for Arab independence
eventually led Husayn to take a group of Arabs to revolt against the Turks in 1916.9
While the resentment with the British and French influence continued, the Allied powers
agreed to divide governance of the region into separate Class “A” mandates at the Conference of
San Remo in 1920. They followed along the lines similar to those agreed upon under the

8

Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Sykes-Picot Agreement." Encyclopedia Britannica, May 22, 2020.
https://www.britannica.com/event/Sykes-Picot-Agreement.
9
Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Sykes-Picot Agreement." Encyclopedia Britannica, May 22, 2020.
https://www.britannica.com/event/Sykes-Picot-Agreement.
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Sykes-Picot Agreement. These were the lines that split up the Arab land and created the modern
Middle Eastern states’ borders. 10
First, Sir Percy Cox became the high commissioner of Iraq. The British abolished some
of the institutions established during the Ottoman reform efforts, including the elected municipal
councils. Instead, they worked through local leaders they trusted to maintain order in the
countryside. They introduced a Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulation, modeled after a
similar law in India, which gave certain sheiks the authority to settle all disputes within their
tribes and to collect taxes for the government. In addition, money flowed to the sheiks through
government projects and land grants. These changes are important to note because they put Iraqis
further under the control of a foreign government, creating more tension between Iraqis and the
British.
The governing body established in the mandate was modeled on that of Great Britain, a
constitutional monarchy with a parliament, as well as a king. At the Cairo Conference in 1921,
the British chose Prince Faisal bin Hussein to be the first monarch. He was a member of an
influential Sunni family in the Arab world and one of Britain’s wartime Arabian allies, but not
actually an Iraqi.11 King Faisal was greatly influenced by the British, so Britain still had a lot of
indirect power. This exacerbated the dissatisfaction with the mandate situation. The manner in
which it was being administered led to the formation of three secret, nationalist societies.12 The
ideals being spread through these societies resulted in uprisings against British rule across the
country.

10

Wright, Robin, Jon Lee Anderson, Dexter Filkins, and Elias Muhanna. “How the Curse of Sykes-Picot Still
Haunts the Middle East,” April 30, 2016.
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-curse-of-sykes-picot-still-haunts-the-middle-east.
11
Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
12
ripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
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The revolt, which united Sunnis and Shias, was intense, but short lived. The Iraqis were
met with fierce aerial bombardment and suppression by the British Air Force. 13 This use of air
forces to maintain internal order and resist external aggression is just the one of the first
examples of how violence has been systematically implemented in Iraq to control a population.
To emphasize the effect that it had on the country, a quote by a tribesman encapsulates the
oppression by the British-controlled government, “There are only two things to fear - Allah and
the Hukūmat al-Tayyaraat [government by aircraft].14” The rebellion brought together different
religious and ethnic groups, as well as city dwellers and tribal peoples.
Sara Pursley interestingly points out that the rebellions were actually more likely born out
of the anger towards the British still being in power as a whole, rather than Shia resistance to the
Sunni leader. I agree with her point that “In its [Britan’s] attempt to depoliticize and sectarianize
resistance against the mandate, the narrative is far more consistent with British colonial
reasoning than would have been a recognition of the anticolonial motives of the rebels.15” If this
was the case, it supports my idea that violence in Iraq is not only due to sectarianism, but rather
more deeply entrenched factors such as colonialism and self-serving leaders.
Throughout the 1920s, the government frequently changed, and political parties
functioned on the basis of alliances between different people attempting to further their or their
group’s interests.16 Peter Sluglett described it this way, “The ideological and moral bankruptcy of
the political system was glaringly evident, particularly to those who were excluded from full
participation in it.17”
13

Dodge, Toby. Inventing Iraq: the Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied. London: C. Hurst, 2010.
A tribesman speaking to G.A. Moore, a Special Services Officer (SSO), Hillah Liwa, 7 January 1924, PRO, Air
Ministry Files (AIR) 23/445, I/2106, part 8, p. 50.
15
Pursley, Sarah. Violence in Iraq: Some Methodological and Historiographical Questions. Religion Violence and
the State in Iraq, p. 75 . 2019.
16
Sassoon, Joseph. Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party. Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
17
Peter Sluglett, Le parti Baas: panarabisme, national-socialisme et dictature, in Kutschera (ed.) Le Livre Noir, p.
82
14
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Iraq assumed responsibility for its own defense in 1928. Passing a conscription law was
debated in parliament, military officers felt it was a necessity for a strong army and the most
affordable option. On the other hand, the Kurds and the Shiite tribesmen opposed conscription,
seeing it as a continuation of the Ottoman traditions of control. Britain told the Iraqi government
that they would not help with the establishment of a military service system or with containing
any uprisings that might result from the decision. This stance was seen by Iraqi nationalists as an
example of an attitude of colonialism on the part of the British, but the conscription bill failed to
get through the Parliament that year.18
During the mandate years, Iraqi nationalists continued to call for complete independence.
Although a new treaty was drafted to give Iraq more independence within the mandate
framework, it did not satisfy the nationalists and was never implemented. While it was not
actually the deal that made the borders, resentment to the Sykes-Picot Agreement still lingers in
the region. When the provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul were cobbled together, it would
lead to challenges in dealing with the rich diversity of ethnic and religious groups, regional
affiliations, and languages within their borders.19 Iraq’s borders also disrupted traditional trade
routes. Northern Iraq suffered economically from the division from Syria and Iran, with which
residents had had commercial relationships. In the south, the line drawn across the desert, a
region the British thought of as uninhabited, disturbed long-used tribal migration patterns.20
Today, Iraq is made up of Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Turkmen, Assyrians, and Persians. It

18

Iraq: Legal History and Traditions. The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center. June, 2004.
Sassoon, Joseph. Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party. Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
20
Iraq: Legal History and Traditions. The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center. June, 2004.
19
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planted the seed for borders to split widespread populations such as the Kurds and the Druz,
leaving them as minorities and unable to self-determinate.21
In the interwar period, the Pan-Arab movement was on the rise, but struggled to succeed
in the new climate because the colonial-drawn borders led to a growth of separate identities. The
split between the various groups in Iraqi society was far from resolved, and actions taken during
the mandate years exacerbated the problem. Pan-Arabism was an ideology influenced by Sati’
al-Husri and supporters advocated for the political, cultural, and socioeconomic unity of all
Arabs. It emphasized the Arabic language, Arab Nationalism, and Arabic history; it was
inherently anti-colonial and anti-imperial.22 At this time, Al-Husri negated a sense of Iraqi
identity for a single Arab identity. 23 Pan-Arabs considered the Sykes-Picot agreement to be
imperialist imposition, and it lead to continued tension between the Arabs, French, British, and
the Zionist movement.
On October 13, 1932, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as a sovereign state,
though with continued strong British influence. While al-Husri was trying to spread Pan-Arab
ideals to push against this influence, the country was actually fraught with communal tensions,
tribal rebellions, and the intrusion of the army into politics. Because the Pan-Arab movement at
the time was mostly exclusive to Sunni Arabs, the Assyrians in northern Iraq were kept from
participating and being represented fully in Iraqi society. Because of this, they began to demand
more autonomy, and this was seen as a challenge to Iraq’s national unity that was already weak.
In response, Bakr Sidiqi, the army general in charge of the Mosul area, massacred hundreds of
Assyrians in August 1933. Having gained a reputation for this violent act, Sidiqi launched Iraq’s
21

Wright, Robin, Jon Lee Anderson, Dexter Filkins, and Elias Muhanna. “How the Curse of Sykes-Picot Still
Haunts the Middle East,” April 30, 2016.
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-curse-of-sykes-picot-still-haunts-the-middle-east.
22
Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Pan-Arabism." Encyclopedia Britannica, March 5, 2020.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pan-Arabism.
23
Sassoon, Joseph. Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party. Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
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first coup d’etat in October 1936, thus signaling the entry of the military into politics and setting
a precedent for the use of violence to settle political disputes.24 Soon after, Sidiqi was
assassinated in 1937. This ushered in another period of instability.
In 1938, Nuri al-Sa’id became prime minister through another coup. When World War II
began in Europe in 1939, Iraq severed diplomatic relations with Germany, interning German
nationals in the country and offering full support to the Allies. In April of 1941, another military
coup took place, and Rashid Ali al-Kaylani came to power. According to Joseph Sassoon, this
coup was targeted against the monarch itself, rather than just replacing the prime minister.25 The
new regime was ultranationalist in nature and sympathetic to the Axis, refusing to allow British
troop landings. The British argued that the refusal was a violation of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi
Treaty, and sent in troops for a second occupation of Iraq. A brief period of fighting - known as
the Anglo-Iraqi War - lasted for thirty days. Rashid Ali and the ruling cabinet fled to Egypt.
Eventually, Iraqi forces succumbed to the British. On May 30, 1941, an armistice was signed
which reestablished the regency.26 A consequence of the power vacuum that resulted was two
days of extreme violence against the Jewish community of Baghdad. Because they were regarded
as pro-British, the carnage lasted until order was back in place. Rashid and the four generals
were in turn charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. The generals were executed when
they returned to the country, but Rashid remained abroad. While a formal legal system was in
existence, it was used as a tool of political forces by both sides in the events of 1941. In addition,
this second occupation by the British army and the alignment of the monarchy with the invading

24

Sassoon, Joseph. Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party. Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
Sassoon, Joseph. Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party. Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
26
Matthew Elliot, “INDEPENDENT IRAQ”: THE MONARCHY AND BRITISH INFLUENCE 1941-58. 1996.
25
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forces contributed to a widespread distrust of the king and regent, who were seen as out of touch
with popular, nationalist sentiment.27
In 1952, martial law was declared after large-scale demonstrations against the
government broke out. They came at a time of economic hardship following a bad harvest and
the overthrow of a monarchy in Egypt. All political parties were banned, some newspapers were
suspended, and a curfew was imposed. A group of young army officers began secretly plotting to
overthrow the government and the monarchy. The constitutional monarchy came to an end in
1958 when soldiers entered the royal palace and killed the king, the still-active regent, the Prime
Minister, and a number of family members. The British embassy was attacked and burned by
anti-government groups.28 The leaders of the rebellion, Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif and Brigadier
Abd al-Karim Qasim, closed parliament and established a republican regime. Qasim, supported
by the Communist Party and other nationalists became the leader. The swift success of the coup
was due more to feelings of resentment and the desire for change on the part of large segments of
the population rather than to devotion to a consistent ideology or a coherent group of activists.29
It was during this time that the Ba’ath party began to emerge in Iraq.
Resentment against Qasim grew throughout his rule. In March 1959, the underlying
tensions led to the Mosul Revolt. The turmoil symbolized the complexity of the various conflicts
that permeated Iraqi politics and society. While short-lived, Joseph Sassoon points out that this
revolt was a significant event in Iraqi history. “Kurds attacked Turkomans who supported the
revolt, and communists massacred nationalists. Looting in Mosul and summary executions

27

Iraq: Legal History and Traditions. The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center. June, 2004.
Iraq: Legal History and Traditions. The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center. June, 2004.
29
Sassoon, Joseph. Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party. Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
28
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reflected the deep fissures between Kurds and Arabs, peasants and landlords, communists and
nationalists.30”
By the end of 1962, Qasim had alienated a group of officers in the army, other Arab
nations, and numerous Iraqi political parties and factions, including student groups, the
Communist Party, and the Ba’ath underground organization. In the 1950s and 1960s, the
Ba’athist party was controlled by Fu’ad al Rikabi, a Shia. The organization was made up almost
entirely of Shias from the working class. By 1968, the role of Sunnis in the party had risen
sharply, while the Shias’ involvement declined. 31
The Ba’athist organization organized a coup. On February 8, 1963, military units led by
Qasim’s opponents took over key government sites, including the radio station and the Ministry
of Defense building. Qasim was executed without trial. It was also an opportunity for them to
target the communist party members. It was estimated that about 5,000 communists were killed
in a span of two days.32 They established a National Council of the Revolutionary Command
(NCRC) as the highest decision-making body and installed Colonel Arif as President. Arif’s
five-year rule was characterized by military dominance in the government and by the
appointment of his relatives and close friends in key positions.
By 1968, the government was losing public and military support. The fact that Iraq did
not have a large role in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war played a part in the loss of legitimacy, as did
the factional, ethnic, and sectarian conflicts within the regime. There was a sense of anarchy
throughout the country. A group of military officers with no organizational structure or popular
support coordinated a coup in July 1968, and the new Ba’ath party leadership took power within
a few weeks.
30

Sassoon, Joseph. Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party. Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
Blaydes, Lisa. State of Repression. Princeton University Press, 2018
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Sassoon, Joseph. Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party. Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
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Saddam Hussein Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti was born in Tikrit, Iraq in 1937. His father
abandoned his mother while she was pregnant, but she later married a man known as the Liar.
The Liar was not rich, so he taught Saddam to steal, instead of sending him to school. Saddam’s
uncle soon took him in to live with him. Under the influence of his intellectual uncle, his
knowledge of the world began to expand beyond his small village. A few years later, his uncle
was arrested for an anti government plot, and Saddam returned to his mother.33 Saddam joined
the Ba’athist party in 1956.34
When the Ba’ath party came to power in 1968, one of Saddam’s distant cousins, Ahmad
Hasan al-Bakr became president, and at thirty-one years old, Saddam became the vice president
of Iraq. Violence played a major role from the beginning of his rule to the end. He also was in
charge of the torture mechanism of the Ba’ath party. He was known to torture political opponents
with rubber hoses filled with stones, sticking glass bottle in their anus and smashing it by kicking
them, or submerging them into vats of boiling water. While in this position, he established a
secret police force called Jihaz al-Haneen, or Instrument of Yearning. All of its members were
recruited from Tikrit, ensuring their loyalty to him. By doing this, he was quietly building his
position within the party.
However, he did not just kill and torture. He was responsible for nationalizing Iraq’s oil
industry, hoping the influx of money to the country would deter any rebellion against the
regime.35 By 1977, Saddam had replaced the top army commanders with his own loyalists, and
on July 16, 1979, he took full control of the government by forcing al-Bakr to resign. As he
became consumed with remaining in power, his devotion to the cause of socialism and Arab
Nationalism fell into the background.
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Saddam admired Joseph Stalin, and modeled himself after the Soviet leader.
As the government was officially Ba’athist, it should have aligned with socialism, secularism,
and Pan-Arabism. While the party claimed these ideals publicly, Saddam quickly twisted them
for his own advantage. In the 1970s and 1980s, the party took on a pragmatic form, while later
on it turned opportunistic in the 1990s. Saddam and the Ba’athist elite controlled a number of
strong instruments of state power including the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the
Ba’ath Party, the security services, and the military. First, Saddam Hussein directly aligned the
military within the Ba’athist government. All legislative and executive powers were vested in the
RCC, which exclusively consisted of members of the Ba’ath party or army officers. Saddam was
the chairman of the RCC, prime minister, and commander of the armed forces. He was
accountable to only the RCC.36 All of his top bodyguards and officials were from Tikrit, most of
them related to Saddam in some way. With this approach, the Iraqi people had very little to no
say in their government. This structure gave the regime a monopoly over violence in the state.
Dan Stone interestingly said, “Those who enjoy the monopoly on the means of violence can also
turn their life threatening power against their own subject populations.37”
Additionally, Saddam justified the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War on the grounds of
Pan-Arabism. In a speech on army day in January 1984, Saddam stated
“the hateful and ambitious regime in Tehran aims not only at Iraq but also at the
whole Arab Homeland, particularly the Arab peninsula and the Gulf. It started its
aggression against Iraq first because Iraq is the impenetrable bulwark that stands in the
way of its ambitions. As we have always said, Iraq’s brave confrontation of this
aggression is in defence of the principles and security of the nation, the Arab peninsula
and the Gulf, in particular. As events have proved, the best way to confront the ambitions
and subversive attempts of the malicious regime in Tehran is by strengthening the links of
Arab solidarity and by adhering to the bases of joint Arab security and increasing support
36

Jillani, Anees. “Nasser, Saddam and Pan-Arabism.” Pakistan Horizon, vol. 44, no. 2, 1991, pp. 75–88. JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/41394583.
37
Stone, Dan. "Modernity and Violence: Theoretical Reflections on the Einsatzgruppen." Journal of Genocide
Research, vol. 1, no. 3, 1999, pp. 367-378.

22

for Iraq by every means and without demur. Moreover, it will also be achieved by
promoting joint Arab action against this vicious regime which persists in its aggression
and expansion despite the defeats Iraq has inflicted on it and the lessons it has taught it.”
While Saddam claimed that Iran “started its aggression first,” most Arabs knew that Iraq was the
aggressor in the war. From Saddam’s perspective, the war had little to do with a united Arab
cause and more to do with land expansion. In fact, as several Arab countries including Syria
openly supported Iran, the war actually worked more against the unification of the Arab world. 38
Just three years after the almost decade-long war, Saddam attempted his invasion of
Kuwait. In his past promotion of Pan-Arab ideals he warned against using an Arab weapon
against an Arab and warned against the penetration of Arab army into the territory of another
Arab country. In 1990, Saddam ordered his army to invade Kuwait, abandoning his pan-Arab
rhetoric for his own gain. The Gulf War devastated Iraq. It also continued to divide the Arab
masses and their leaders. The use of military production and deployment to stimulate economic
growth and economic distribution can result in heavily nationalist, racist, and sexist ideologies.
History repeated itself almost seventy years later from the 1920s revolution, when Iraq was
defeated with a major bombing campaign by the Western forces. While the leaders had to take a
principled stance against the invading country, the general populations with no knowledge of
international law or the United Nations Charter saw the conflict as an attempt by an imperialist
power to crush a strong Arab army. 39
On August 6, 1990, just four days after Saddam invaded Kuwait, the United Nations
Security Council imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on all of Iraq. Security Council
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Resolution 661 aimed to achieve two goals: withdrawal of Iraqi forces to their positions prior to
August 2, 1990, and the return of the Kuwaiti government to power.
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Chapter 3: Economic Sanctions
3.1 Implementation of the Sanctions
The bombing campaign destroyed nearly all of Iraq’s infrastructure, industrial capacity,
agricultural, telecommunications, and critical public services, but the country was experiencing
just the beginning of the effects of the Gulf War. On August 6, 1990, just four days after Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council imposed comprehensive economic
sanctions on all of Iraq. They were binding to all UN members. Security Council Resolution 661
aimed to achieve two goals: withdrawal of Iraqi forces to their positions prior to August 2, 1990,
and the return of the Kuwaiti government to power.40 The scope of the sanctions, unanimous
support, and swiftness with which they were passed was rare.41 The governments supporting
these sanctions, mainly the United States and Europe, hoped that they would weaken the Iraqi
government, military machinery, and public morale and force the authorities to rescind their
decision. Arguably, the sanctions exposed both strengths and weaknesses in the government.
Nimah Mazaheri lays out four ways that the sanctions helped Saddam in Iraq and the Domestic
Political Effects of Economic Sanctions. According to him, Iraq’s rationing system, the increased
domestic ideological support and regional empathy during the sanctions, the ability of sanctions
to enhance state power and eliminate political alternatives, and flaws in the design and scope of
the sanctions program contributed to this.42 While the military did pull out, the sanctions brought
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years of devastation on the country and its people, distrust and hate of Western powers, and
influenced violence of many forms from inside and outside of the country.
Resolution 661 prevented all states from importing any commodities and products
originating in Iraq or Kuwait that were exported after the date of the resolution. As a result, this
resolution effectively cut off Iraq's economy and any ability to assert its influence and ideals. It
also prevented all states from selling or supplying any commodities or products, including
weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories to Iraq
and Kuwait. This did not include supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in
humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body. Despite this “humanitarian”
clause, the country could not import any equipment needed to restore the infrastructure which
had serious implications for the health and well-being of the civilians. No states were allowed to
give Iraq or Kuwait funds through commercial, industrial or public utility purposes. Lastly, it
called upon all States, including non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance
with the provisions of the resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted
before the date of the resolution. States were called to take appropriate measures to protect the
legitimate government of Kuwait and not recognize any regime set up by the occupying power.43
Adding to the severe and unusual nature of the sanctions, Iraq did not have the option of shifting
to an alternate trade bloc. This occurred in the Cold War when sanctions were imposed on Cuba,
which still developed trade relations with the Soviet Union.44 Iraq’s heavy dependency on oil as a
major source of foreign revenue and trade reliance made it even more unusually vulnerable to the
sanctions.
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3.2 Effects of the Sanctions
Though the war only lasted six weeks, the sanctions extended beyond a decade. They
continued to ban all trade and financial resources, except for medicine and humanitarian needs,
which were still closely regulated. A cease-fire resolution, 687, was adopted April 3, 1991. It
called for a permanent ceasefire agreement. It required Iraq to destroy all of its chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons capabilities that it ironically acquired in the eighties with the
help of some of the permanent members of the security council. Furthermore, inspectors from the
UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
would verify that Iraq was cooperating with these measures. According to previous Iraqi Oil
Minister, Lieutenant General Amir Muhammad Rashid, Iraq lost $85 billion in revenue as a
result of the ban on the export of its oil between August 6, 1990 and July 1995.45 At the same
time, Saddam and the ruling elite dealt with the growing economic crisis through repression and
incompetence in managing the domestic economy.
The dictatorship struggled with the unanticipated and prolonged shock that the extreme
sanctions caused. According to the Duelfer Report of the Iraq Survey Group, Saddam’s regime
severely underestimated the likely economic consequences of the complete embargo, in part
because of a poor reading of previous cases from the 1980s, such as South Africa. 46 After losing
the two wars that his country started and the devastation of Iraq’s economy and society by the
sanctions, Saddam Hussein was increasingly being perceived as weak and vulnerable in the
public eye. On February 15, 1991, United States President, George H.W. Bush, made a speech
urging Iraqis to overthrow Saddam on the Voice of America radio. He said, “There is another
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way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take
matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside, and then
comply with the United Nations' resolutions and rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.” He
made a similar statement on March 1.
3.3 Rebellion
Resentment grew through a combination of the effects of the sanctions and the political
fallout following the war. The Iraqi people felt that they had the support of the United States after
Bush’s speeches, and were convinced that the army was extremely weak and demoralized after
the defeat. On March 3, 1991, an Iraqi tank commander fired a shell through a portrait of
Saddam which hung in Basra’s main square, the onlooking soldiers applauded.47 The uprisings
that commenced against the Sunni regime consisted of a diverse mix of ethnic, religious and
political affiliations, including military mutineers, Shia Arab Islamists, Kurdish nationalists, and
far-left groups. In the Shiite-majority cities of Basra, Karbala, and Najaf, hundreds of unarmed
civilians spilled out onto the streets and took control of government buildings, freeing prisoners
from jails and seizing caches of small arms. In Najaf, the rebels seized the Imam Ali Mosque
after a gun battle with Saddam’s security forces. Additionally, many exiled Iraqi dissidents,
including thousands of Iran-based Badr Brigades militants of SCIRI, crossed the borders and
joined the rebellion. Within the first two weeks, the rebel forces held fourteen of the country’s
eighteen provinces, and the fighting spread within miles of Baghdad. This was the height of the
rebellion.
Catastrophical to the success of the rebellion, all the diverse revolutionary groups,
militias, and parties were united only in their desire for regime change. They had no common
47

“Flashback: the 1991 Iraqi Revolt.” BBC News. BBC, August 21, 2007.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2888989.stm.

28

political or military program, no integrated leadership, and there was very little coordination
between them.48 In contrast, the uprisings that broke out in the Northern Kurdish region of Iraq
were organized by two rival Kurdish party-based militias: primarily the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) and to a lesser extent the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). In the North, the
defection of the government-recruited Kurdish home guard militias, known as jash, gave a
considerable force to the rebellion. On March 7, in an effort to quiet the uprisings, Saddam
Hussein offered the Shia and Kurd leaders shares in the central government in exchange for
loyalty, but the opposing groups rejected the proposal. By March 20th, they controlled every city
in the North except for Mosul. The Northern rebels reportedly executed at least 60 captured
Ba'athist officials and security officers without a trial. Unlike in the South, the Kurdish rebellion
was preceded by demonstrations with clear political slogans: democracy for Iraq and autonomy
for Kurdistan. According to the Iraqi government, “gangs of subversives and perfidious traitors,
instigated by hostile political bodies which took their orders from leaders outside the country,
turned religious centres into bases for resistance against the government authorities. These bases
were also used for purposes of torture, trials and executions by those same gangs.49”
On March 3, 1991, the commander of UN coalition forces, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf,
met with Saddam’s generals at the Safwan Airfield in Iraq to discuss the terms of the ceasefire.
They focused on the lines of demarcation between opposing forces, the mechanisms for
exchanging prisoners of war, and an order by Schwarzkopf that Iraq not fly fixed-wing aircraft.
During the discussion, an Iraqi general asked Schwarzkopf for permission to fly helicopters,
including armed gunships, to transport government officials over the country’s destroyed roads
and bridges. Believing it a legitimate request, Schwarzkopf replied, “I will instruct the Air Force
48
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not to shoot at any helicopters flying over the territory of Iraq where our troops are not located.”
As a result of this order, helicopters were widely used to suppress the rebellion.50 This time, the
violent repression of Iraqis by air force was carried out by its own leaders. While patrolling
southern Iraq, U.S. F-15s watched Iraqi helicopters attack Shia insurgents. Once the loyalist
troops regrouped and mounted their counteroffensive, it was likely that only massive foreign
assistance or intervention could have saved the ill-equipped and inexperienced rebels. With little
more than Kalashnikovs, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and a few captured tanks and
artillery pieces, the Shi'a and Kurdish rebels were almost defenseless against helicopter gunships
and indiscriminate mortar and artillery barrages. They had few anti-tank weapons and even fewer
surface-to-air missiles. Delegates from two dozen Iraqi opposition groups appealed to the United
States for help, but administration officials repeatedly said they would not involve U.S. troops in
what they considered an internal matter for the Iraqi people.
While the rebels’ attacks on security forces were brutal, they were not nearly as
systematic and sustained as those by the government. They fired upon homes and hospitals,
performed mass executions in the streets, used women and children as shields for the tanks,
arrested people with or without charge, and used the helicopters to target people who attempted
to flee.51 In the end, Saddam Hussein’s regime, using only helicopters, long-range artillery, and
armored ground forces, brutally counterattacked the uprising, killing 30,000-60,000 Shias in the
south, and some 20,000 Kurds in the north.52 The government claimed that security forces had
arrested a total of 15,105 persons for participating in the disturbances, of whom 14,005 had been
amnestied and 1,100 were to be tried. While many were released, the exact numbers were never
50
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discovered. Moreover, thousands of detained Iraqis went missing, either thought to have escaped
to surrounding countries or executed by the government forces.53
Post-uprising repression was particularly harsh in the two Shia holy cities of al-Najaf and
Karbala. After the uprising, religious institutions and prominent clerical families were targeted in
a campaign to subdue Shia opposition, which Saddam likely viewed as the greatest potential
popular threat to his rule.54 The regime targeted Shia cultural and nonpolitical institutions. These
attacks were part of what they called a campaign of "revenge on a massive scale" in southern
Iraq. Many important Shiites shrines were destroyed in the shelling of the cities.55 This religious
violence against the Shia-majority population aimed to destroy the fabric of Shia society.
3.4 The Aftermath: More Suffering
Iraq now faced the aftermath of a war, economic sanctions, and rebellions. The lack of
physical infrastructure was one of the most devastating effects of the three. For a time, there was
no water, electricity, telephone, or gas service.56 Damage to electrical plants, water purification
facilities, and sewage systems directly contributed to the rise of typhoid and cholera. Because the
hospitals did not have proper electricity, hygiene equipment, and water supply, the medical
system failed to assist the injured and ill.
Sanctions severely limited state income streams and left the Iraqi state reliant on about
$800 million per year earned through oil smuggling, liquidation of hidden assets, and
government gold reserves. Hyperinflation eroded savings accounts and caused civil worker

53

Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath. Human Rights Watch, 1992.
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm.
54
Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath. Human Rights Watch, 1992.
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm.
55
Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath. Human Rights Watch, 1992.
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm.
56
Ismael, Jacqueline and Shereen Ismael. 2007. “Iraqi Women under Occupation: From Tribalism to
Neo-Feudalism.” International Jordan of Contemporary Iraqi Studies. 2(3): 409-424

31

salaries to fall to U.S.$2-3 per month from 1993-1999. By the late 1990s, unemployment reached
an estimated 40 percent.
Furthermore, Iraqi women and girls were disproportionately affected by the UN
sanctions. Previously, women had enjoyed a relatively better status in the public sphere during
Saddam’s presidency, compared to the wider Middle East. The economic consequences of the
sanctions including less access to food, health care, and education were compounded by changes
in laws that restricted women's mobility and access to the formal sector in an effort to ensure
jobs to men.57 Additionally, the gender gap in school enrollment (and subsequently female
illiteracy) increased dramatically due to families' financial inability to send all of their children to
school. When faced with limited resources, many families chose to keep their female children at
home, since the males were more likely to become the family’s “breadwinner.58”
The price of food increased exponentially, and most of the population struggled to
maintain basic food security. While the malnutrition of pregnant women caused an increase in
pregnancy-related mortality and low birthweight infants, Saddam continued to eat normally.
Everything he ate was grown or raised on his farm at one of his palaces. He and his ruling clique
also continued to grow richer from smuggling oil.
In 1992, the UN offered the Iraqi government an opportunity to sell $1.6 billion worth of
oil to pay for food and medicine. Saddam rejected the offer. Over the next four years Saddam
continued to dismiss similar offers, letting the Iraqi people suffer rather than allow any
constraints to be opposed on his presidency.59 Additionally, the government cut any illustration of
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food out of tv programs and other media channels because it did not want Iraqis to see varieties
of meat and fruits during this time.60
In order to prevent mass starvation, the Iraqi government implemented a food rationing
system. While it was effective, it was also used as an “instrument of control” by the Ba’athist
regime. Since citizens had to rely on the government for such a basic necessity, the regime
became an even more important part of people’s lives. This reliance, along with religion, is a tool
that Saddam continued to exploit through the Return to Faith Campaign in the mid-1990s. Rohde
argues in State-Society Relations in Ba’athist Iraq: Facing Dictatorship that “the increasing
dependence of most Iraqis on a government-run food rationing system actually strengthened state
power vis-a-vis the weakened Iraqi society and created considerable breathing space for the
regime.61” According to an Iraqi refugee, “the need to have a ration card is a form of pressure on
families to do what the government wants.62” This likely minimized the discussion of more
uprisings against Saddam as party lines, ethnic ties, and economic status faded away in the
shadow of hunger.
By 1995, there was still no clean water and electricity was only available for about three
or four hours a day. As conditions worsened, Saddam finally agreed to implement an oil-for-food
system in December 1996. It allowed Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil every six months for the
purchase of essential supplies.63 While it did increase the amount of food available to the public,
it still put more resources in the hands of the corrupt regime, allowing Saddam to further gain
favor of his loyal subjects through handouts. Additionally, much of the medical supplies they
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received ended up being sold on the black market in Jordan, with the profits going straight back
to the regime.64
Economically motivated crimes surged throughout this time. Theft was on the rise, as
was sex work. Saddam’s response to Iraqis trying to feed their families was to implement a harsh
punishment in 1994 for people found guilty of stealing. He ordered that thieves should have their
right hand cut off while frequent offenders were to have their left leg cut off from the knee.
Furthermore, armed robbery would carry the death penalty.65 According to Alissa Walter
Saddam’s renewed focus on Baghdad’s underground sex industry was the product of two
inter-related trends in the 1990s: the regime’s faith campaign and Saddam’s reliance on
spectacles of violence to govern a badly weakened state.66
3.5 Applying Theoretical Concepts of Violence to the Iraqi Case
In “The Political Economy of Rationing in Iraq,” Alissa Walter explores the notion that
the rations distribution system helped erase societal differences, including sectarian differences,
particularly since the rations were distributed without regard for identity markers.67 The ideas of
segmentation, marginalization, and fragmentation can help this argument. To reiterate,
segmentation is when the underdog has only a partial idea of what is happening. Marginalization
keeps the underdogs on the outside, while fragmentation keeps the underdogs away from each
other. The marginalization that occured between Iraqis of all sects and the ruling elite during this
time resulted in extreme hardship experienced by the public compared to the leaders that were
hoarding resources and using them for their benefit. While Iraq experienced this side of
segmentation, I agree with Alissa Walter, there was no fragmentation between the suffering
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civilians, no matter their religious affiliation or ethnicity. Rather, I think the goal of just surviving
outweighed these differences.
It also blurred the lines between the middle and lower classes. Party members, senior
officers, and civil servants were often eligible for a larger allocation, which suggests a political
divide instead of sectarian logic. While the sanctions affected the Iraqi public through economic
collapse and a following humanitarian crisis, they arguably strengthened the regime. Many
scholars argue that Saddam was able to capitalize on the social, economic, demographic, and
emotional effects of sanctions to reap significant political benefits.68
The sanctions resulted in structural, direct, and cultural violence. These manifested
through economic and cultural violence. Both direct and structural violence create needs-deficits.
When this happens, trauma occurs. When an entire group is exposed to trauma, the collective
trauma can sediment into the collective subconscious and become raw material for major
historical processes and events. According to Galtung, the underlying assumption by many is
simple: 'violence breeds violence'. Violence is needs-deprivation; the reaction to
needs-deprivation is direct violence. Alternatively, there could also be a feeling of hopelessness,
a deprivation/frustration syndrome that shows up on the inside as self-directed aggression and on
the outside as apathy and withdrawal.69 Additionally, when applying Kaul and Kezstyus’s ideas
that describe the evolution of economic violence, violence in Iraq did go through evolution due
to the sanctions. It began with the direct economic effects of unemployment and inflation which
led to revolt, harsh punishment for crimes, and eventually death.
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Saddam greatly benefited from having the population weak and fearful. Violently
suppressed uprisings, a humanitarian crisis, and state manipulation of the public all resulted from
the violent decade of sanctions in Iraq. Saddam and the international community share equal
responsibility for the problems that the sanctions caused. When given a choice between a boiling
and violent or a freezing and apathetic society as reaction to massive needs-deprivation, leaders
tend to prefer the latter. They likely prefer governability to trouble and anarchy. Indeed, a major
form of cultural violence by ruling elites is to blame the victim of structural violence who throws
the first stone, not in a glasshouse but to get out of the iron cage, stamping him as 'aggressor,' as
the government did during the violent repressions of the rebellions.70 In order to keep the
population subdued, Saddam implemented the Return to Faith Campaign.
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Chapter 4: Return to Faith Campaign
4.1 Saddam’s Turn to Religion
Soon after being subjected to the UN sanctions, Iraq’s economy began to fail. By 1994,
inflation reached over 24,000%. The Iraqi dinar lost its value when the regime started printing its
own currency. The middle class was hit the hardest. The circumstances led the regime to act
radically in dealing with the changes taking place. Religion was the most viable option at the
time, when the regime had no more rewards to distribute or punishment to bring about, as its
forces were still disoriented by the failed interventions. More so, the political cost was too high
for the regime to further repress the already-repressed population.71
Religious violence is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. It involves political,
sociological, and psychological processes.72 Saddam’s turn to Islam in the last decade of his rule
was less about his Return to Faith, and more of a strategic plan to Islamicize the regime on the
outside in order to further gain control over the Iraqi public. This strategy also allowed him to
gain favor of outside Muslim leaders, in an attempt to increase his support outside of Iraq.
Additionally, it was an effort to gather religious leaders to carry out surveillance in mosques and
religious schools and to pressure imams to reinforce regime messaging through Friday
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sermons.73 By acting faithful, they sought to act preemptively and overrule the pronouncements
of clerics who were thought to incite rebellions.74
Lastly, he wanted to counterbalance the possible spread of Khomeinism among Iraqis, an
ideology that focuses on a variety of themes, including absolute religious authority in
government and the rejection of Western interference and influence. It also popularized the Shiite
Islamic concept of wilayat-e faqih—which translates to “guardianship of the Islamic jurist”—
which placed all of Iran’s religious and state institutions under the control of a single cleric.75 In
theory, the regime hoped that pushing the public towards Islam would distract from the mounting
economic hardship and the deteriorating quality of life brought on by the sanctions and wars.
Religion has proved to be a powerful terror management since it provides the ultimate safety and
protection in the face of mortality during conflict.76 Ihssan Hassan, a sociology professor at
Baghdad University who met with Saddam every few months, was quoted saying, “When a
society is in crisis like we are, with the embargo and all, religion plays a greater part in soothing
the psyche of the people and giving people greater strength to face the crisis.77”
The increased reliance on state institutions and the politicalization of Islam contributed to
its growing influence. The social reform, secularism, and state building efforts that defined the
earlier climate of the regime were basically abandoned in order to cling to power through any
means possible, this time being religious. In addition to this, the country was just coming out of
two wars that it lost. To Saddam, this was even more reason to instrumentalize Islam, so people
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could turn to faith in Allah instead of focusing on the failures of Saddam. Thus, Islam did not
guide Iraqi policy; rather, it was a tool to achieve policy goals.
Saddam and the Ba’athist Party supporters were not necessarily Islamists, but they were
believers, at least publicly. They followed an eccentric interpretation of Islam, developed by
Ba’athist intellectuals in the mid-20th century. Many Ba’athists believed that Islam was the
religion of the Arabs. Arabs were simply Arabs, and separating them into sects divided and
weakened them. Because of this, it was easy for Saddam to spout Islam to support his public
Pan-Arabist front.78
4.2 Implementing the Faith Campaign
Although the Faith Campaign did not officially begin until 1993, Saddam took steps
before that to begin the process. One of the first aspects of the Return to Faith Campaign was
assuring that the regime had loyal religious leaders, whether Sunni or Shia. In 1989, the Saddam
University for Islamic Studies opened.79 This was the next step to create loyal religious leaders
after the Special Institute for the Preparation of Imams and Sermon Givers proved to be
successful in the same mission. The university would play an important role throughout the faith
campaign.
The regime began to apply religious texts to Saddam, such as comparing the era of
boycott against Muhammad and his followers by the tribe of Quraish to the economic
sanctions.80 Compulsory Quran lessons began taking place in schools, universities, and inside the
Ba’ath parties and its affiliated organizations.81 By 1998, the state-owned news publication,
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Babil, regularly dedicated whole pages to “Islamic matters,” recounting various religious topics
in Islamic history, including differences of opinion between the various schools, Sufi orders, and
even Christian sects. Television shows featured religious programming; including talent contests
for Quranic chanting. On the individual level, mosque attendance increased, religious dress and
style (such as veils and long beards) became more common, and alcohol consumption
decreased.82
As the sanctions continued to devastate Iraq by making the poor poorer and putting the
middle class in extreme poverty, economically motivated crimes were on the rise, including
robbery, sex work, and kidnapping. Historically, sex workers always existed in Iraq with
relatively light punishment when caught. Usually, prostitutes were sent to reform houses
anywhere from six months to two years then released when deemed they could “make an honest
living” or were to live under the watch of a husband or male guardian.83 To deal with such
challenges in light of the weak political and security institutions, the Faith Campaign sought to
provide order through what the regime thought were more “acceptable Islamic measures.” This
meant that much harsher sentences were imposed. With a law passed in 1993, pimps and
madams could now face the death penalty for their crimes. In 1994, it was ruled that their
property would be seized as well.84
In hand with the ongoing economic sanctions, Saddam’s decision to embrace more
Islamic and tribal traditions also disproportionately affected women and girls. In collusion with
conservative religious groups and tribal leaders, the government issued numerous decrees and
introduced legislation negatively impacting women's legal status in the labor code, criminal
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justice system, and personal status laws. In 2001, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Violence
against Women reported that since the passage of religious reforms in 1991, an estimated 4,000
women and girls had been victims of "honor killings.85" A Huffington post article defines honor
killings to ‘stem from the belief that a family’s honor is dependent on the sexual purity of its
female members, exempting such crimes from being classified as murder.’ It also stated: ‘The
“crime” can range from sexual relations outside of marriage, to inappropriate dress or having any
kind of contact with a man outside the family.86’ Today, there are no accurate statistics for
violence against women in Iraq due to the multiple wars and civil discourse since 2001. In spite
of limited data, it is agreed that honor violence is still widespread. Some analysts claim, with
reference to UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women), that there are at least
400 honor killings a year; but most honor killings, suicides and other acts against women go
unreported.87
Furthermore in line with his Islamically themed discourse, Saddam commissioned
mosques to be built as monuments after the second Gulf War. The first, named ‘The Mother of
Battles Mosque’ (Jamiʿ Umm al-Maʿarik), was four minarets shaped like the barrels of
Kalashnikov rifles (43 metres high, one metre for each day of the war) and four others
resembling Scud missiles (37 metres high, for Saddam's year of birth, 1937). These surrounded a
hexagonal domed building set in the middle of an artificial lake in the shape of the Arab world,
containing 28 fountains (which, together with the four inner minarets symbolize the day and
month of Saddam's birthday, 28 April). Also in the complex sat a 7.5-metre wide mosaic of
Saddam's thumbprints and a gold stylization of his initials and – “in a bizarre and blasphemous
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testimony to his faith” – Quran written from Saddam's own blood. As with his many other
rhetorical and visual projects, it represented a hodgepodge of themes – imperialism and the
Persian Gulf War, pan-Arabism, leader-worship, and Islam.88
Similar intentions lay behind his other architectural feats, “The Great Saddam Mosque”
(Jamiʿ Saddam al-Kabir), projected in 1994 to be the second largest mosque in the world, was to
house an Islamic university in each of its towers. More so, one journalist described the “The
Most Compassionate Mosque” (Jamiʿ ar-Rahman) as a “gigantic cluster of domes that seem
borrowed from the design book for Las Vegas.” At the time of his fall, Saddam was planning to
construct yet another structure, the Tower of Babel, a “fitting monument to his hubris and
ambition.89” According to Samuel Helfont, “The blood-inscribed Quran and the military-style
mosques demonstrate how the ironfisted leader of this impoverished and weary country tried to
foster a deepening sense of devotion across Iraq after two wars and ten years of sanctions. While
other regimes sought to suppress or promote fundamentalism, Hussein has decided to co-opt
it.90”
4.3 Applying Theoretical Concepts of Violence to the Faith Campaign
Cultural practices, group dynamics, and human emotions are all important aspects to look
at when analyzing religious violence. As a sub-category of cultural violence, religious violence
can be direct or structural, and I think it was both during the Faith Campaign. When Saddam
combined religion with the state, he was trying to justify his actions and gain the trust and
submission of the Iraqi people. This structural violence was built into society, exposing everyone
to violence, whether they knew it or not. On the other hand, Saddam used direct violence
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towards petty criminals and his enemies that he justified on the basis of religion. Lastly, through
the state’s push towards religion, women and girls were disproportionately exposed to direct
violence.
Saddam’s background, ideological convictions, and style did not support his new
religious awakening. Furthermore, the actions of his regime were also inconsistent with its
spiritual claims. People accepted, or ignored, the regime’s sudden piety, because they feared its
ruthlessness, not because it managed or truly attempted to rally them around its invented
religious nation.91 This campaign was a way to repress a traumatized population by pushing them
into submission under the guise of religion.
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Chapter 5: Media Violence
5.1 Media Under the Ba’athist Regime
Politicization, inflammatory language, and strict regulations have characterized Iraqi
media since its inception. There have been a few moments of light in the states’ media sector
through the decades, but it has mostly been overshadowed by restrictions set by new occupations
or the next leader. These challenges have resulted in violence towards the media and violence
incited by the media. This has affected and will continue to affect Iraq’s peace, stability, and
unity. As I will outline in this chapter, both the freedom of speech and the restriction of it can
lead to violent results.
The Ba’athist regime tightly controlled Iraq's media sector. The state’s media consisted of
two television channels, four radio stations, and five daily newspapers. Social and moral values
and norms were all dictated to the public via the mass media. During this time, the fear of severe
punishment over insignificant mistakes drove journalists to become receptors of information,
rather than producers. The media was generally shaped by the government’s policies, not free
expression or fact. After decades of this behavior, many Iraqi journalists became passive and
preferred to depend on the Iraqi News Agency for information, instead of taking the
responsibility themselves.92 Imprisonment, torture, or death awaited anyone that broke the strict
press rules.
The Ba’ath National Policy Convention mentioned that there must be a struggle against
all the concepts, theories, trends, and methods that “spread sectarianism, chauvinism, racism,
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regionalism, defeat, liberalism, and others that serve imperialism and its foundations.93” During
the sanctions in the 90s, the Iraqi media rhetoric intensified its presentation of Western actions
against the Ba’ath Revolution that were designed by the “American Imperialists” who were “out
to punish Iraq as a nation.94”
The regime’s power over the media sector created a hierarchical atmosphere among
managers and journalists that still exists in Iraq today. This is because many of the old superiors
still remain in positions of power in state-run and private media outlets. Many deeply entrenched
attitudes and practices, like self-censorship, that often occur when reporting on conflicts have
proven to be difficult to abandon, particularly among the influential television channels that
emerged after 2003.95 In 2002, the Press Freedom Index ranked Iraq 130 out of 139 countries in
terms of press freedom and exercising media restriction. It was also in the top ten countries that
were hostile to the media and journalists.96
5.2 Media During the Invasion of Iraq
To understand the media during and after the US invasion, it is important to understand
the political climate. The US created the Iraqi Governing Council, then the 2005 constitution
followed. Since the West blamed many of Iraq’s problems on its sectarian divides, it established
a government system that focused too solely on the divides, instead of Iraq as a whole. This
actually divided the country even more along politico-religious lines. Anthony Shadid rightly
says that the US occupation did not create the differences, ‘but facilitated all of it, giving space to
the region's worst impulses.97’ The elections advised by the Coalition Provisional Authority
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(CPA) resulted in fragmentation of the state along ethnic and sectarian lines, a weak central
government, and a deeply divided political elite.98
The CPA controlled basically all of Iraq’s media while they were in power. As part of the
CPA’s plan for Iraq’s media, the US government aimed to “support a free, independent, and
responsible Iraqi media that delivers high-quality content and responsible reporting throughout
Iraq.99” This was not the case. CPA’S Order No. 14, ‘Prohibited Media Activity,’ issued on June
10, 2003 stated that media organizations were not allowed to publish or broadcast material that:
‘incites violence against any individual or group, including racial, ethnic or religious groups and
women; incites civil disorder, rioting or damage to property; incites violence against Coalition
Forces or CPA personnel.’ Really, this order safeguarded the CPA alone because it was not
enforced when other Iraqis were targeted by the media.100
Iraqis had access to a wide range of information, but audiences were very often subjected
to very polarized content. This is because most private companies relied on political figures or
wealthy businessmen for financial support, which is particularly problematic during election
periods. As a result, media stations became direct mouthpieces of politicians at the expense of
other political actors and citizens getting a more equal coverage.101 The US allowed biased media
messages to run through the states’ media, no matter how polarizing. The only time they
interfered is if they criticized the US.
Furthermore, the rapid growth of the media sector resulted in many untrained,
unprofessional journalists working in the business. Because they did not have the correct
training, it is likely that these journalists used divisive cliches, simplified important news stories,
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and lacked the capacity to report in a conflict-sensitive manner. 102 According to a report by the
United States Institute of Peace, these unprofessional practices can ultimately lead to a poorly
informed audience that only gets one side of a potentially inflammatory story.103 Interestingly, the
CPA issued some regulations in an attempt to organize the media, though it stated that the 1969
Iraqi Penal Code would still be applied. This means that the media laws followed by Saddam
would be functional and valid during the CPA’s authority.
The CPA used its power to shut down any radio, news station, or paper that it accused of
inspiring violence against the coalition forces. Its position of authority allowed it to be the judge
and the jury in these situations. The Agenda theory states that the media shapes the portrayal of
news stories and issues; in turn, this determines what the public gets to think or know about
current events.104 If the Agenda theory is applied to the CPA’s control of Iraqi media, it means
that the United States set the agenda for what the Iraqis were allowed to know, therefore
controlling what they thought.
The result of all of this left Iraq’s political and security climate in a power vacuum. The
first elections led to complex power struggles in many areas across Iraq. Ethnic tensions, Sunni
Arab opposition, and increased violence - all also being incited by the media - gave al Qaeda an
opportunity to gain influence in the country.105
5.3 Media After the Invasion
In post-war Iraq, rising Shia control over the state and government reversed the
Sunni-Shia balance of power almost completely. Shia media outlets increasingly outnumbered
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those owned by Sunnis. While these media outlets can be news reporting, entertainment, or
religious broadcasting, most of them have some sort of political affiliation. Since 2003, Iraqi
media has generally lacked the regulatory framework and the self-regulatory capacity needed to
prevent inflammatory reporting. As a result, the Iraqi media has been used as a political weapon
to instigate violence in Iraq, while at the same time, the media has fallen victim to violent strife
itself.106 The constitution protects freedoms of speech and expression, but most of the related
legislation is often unclear and contradictory. Because of this and the ongoing violence and
restrictions, Iraq is a dangerous place for journalists. They are often the targets of assault and
harassment, in person and online.
The Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (CMC) is responsible for regulating
the state’s media. During elections, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) takes on
the responsibility. Unsurprisingly, both the CMC and IHEC have proved to be vulnerable to
political pressures and politicized decision making.107 While the CMC defines media incitement
to violence as “material that, by its content or tone… carries the clear and immediate risk of
inciting imminent violence, ethnic, or religious hatred, civil disorder or rioting among the people
of Iraq,” the definition can be interpreted and enforced in ways that benefit some people over
others.108 Iraqi journalists’ inability to self-regulate will subject them to continued, biased
regulation and reporting.
The bombing of the Shia Askari Mosque in February 2006 has been widely identified as
the catalyst that began almost two years of brutal sectarian conflict in Iraq, but the reality was
more complex. Tensions between the communities had been building up since the outbursts of
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extremist activity in 2004: the fight with the Sunni insurgency in Fallujah and the battle with
Sadrists forces in Najaf. The 2005 elections and the marginalization of the Sunni community in
the constitutional process increasingly ostracized the Sunni community. Sunnis began to think in
sectarian, rather than national terms. 109 The Shia also had their reservations. They just gained
power through elections for the first time in Iraq’s modern history, giving them a sense of
legitimacy Sunnis could not compete with. Because of this, they were intent on preserving it.
They were also concerned about Salafi-jihadi extremists such as al Zarqawi.110 As tensions grew,
violence broke out before the Askari bombing, and there were 700 murders reported in January
2006. Rather than blaming the outbreak of a civil war on Sunni and Shia division, al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI) was likely the biggest instigator of violence in the country. By inciting violence that
could lead to the fall of the new government, they could reach their goal of taking over Iraq.
Unlike other insurgents, AQI attacked not only the foreign forces and the new government, but
also specific Shia targets, such as the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf in 2003.111
In 2007, three factors began to turn around the deteriorating situation: a surge of US
military forces, the willingness of the Arab Sunni opposition to engage in the political process
with the central government in Baghdad, and further marginalization of the Sadrists.112 The civil
war ended, but a deep distrust between Iraqis remained. Maliki’s consolidation of power worked
against him in the 2010 elections when his opponents won. Their victory disrupted a temporary
social contract between Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian communities, and resulted in a long hiatus of
power as Maliki struggled to maintain his position as prime minister. 113 When the US pulled its
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forces out in 2011 and the Arab Spring began in surrounding countries, Iraq’s temporary political
stability began to unravel again. These fragile conditions lasted until 2014, when the Islamic
State of Iraq and al Sham, rebranded from AQI, entered Iraq.
3.3 Media’s Role in Violence
In 2014, as a result of ISIS being in the country, the CMC issued an order stipulating that
all media outlets conform to “patriotic sense,” and refrain from broadcasting content that is
contrary to the “moral and patriotic order” required for Iraq’s war on terror. 114 When ISIS
controlled territory in Iraq journalists faced brutal repression. In Mosul, ISIS shut down all media
facilities and imprisoned 20 journalists in 2014 alone. Journalists also faced harassment, physical
attacks, and execution outside of ISIS-controlled territories.115
The Iraqi government has also targeted foreign media outlets in order to counter
unfavourable coverage. In 2013, the CMC suspended al Jazeera for “sectarian” reporting, after
the channel covered pro-Sunni demonstrations against the Iraqi government. In April 2016, they
shut down al Jazeera’s Baghdad office. In 2014, the government imposed an indefinite ban on the
printing and distribution of the Saudi-owned, Asharq al-Awsat paper, claiming that its operating
model contravened Iraqi law.116
Content published on the internet in Iraq is relatively free from government intervention,
however the state maintains the ability to close down online communications. After ISIS seized
Mosul in 2014, the Iraqi government imposed highly aggressive, but temporary, measures
including a total internet shutdown in five provinces. They also cut internet access during the
October 2019 protests.117
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According to a survey by Daniella Raz for the Arab Barometer, 76% of Iraqis say they
use the internet. 18-29 year olds account for 89% of the internet users in Iraq. Additionally, 84%
of men and 67% of women say that they use the internet. Lastly, education and income
contribute to internet usage. 79% of people in urban areas say they use the internet, while the
number is 66% for rural areas.118 Studies have found that people with lower levels of education
and income are more likely to believe and share misinformation online.119 48% of people agree
or strongly agree that they are well informed about political events in their country.120 71% of
Iraqis use Facebook, and 37% say that social media is their primary source for information and
news about politics. Importantly, 42% of Iraqis say they agree or strongly agree that they trust
information from social media more than from the newspapers or television. It is also an opinion
shared by the youth and higher educated.121
These statistics are important because since its inception, social media has a growing
influence in Iraq. The Islamic State used it to recruit members and perpetuate the instability that
the country was left in after the invasion. Even after Iraq was liberated from ISIS, non-state and
hybrid militants use it for the same purposes. With so many Iraqis on the internet, they are still
exposed to violence and violent rhetoric everyday. This will often manifest in physical and
material violence.122
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3.4 Analysis
In the midst of political chaos and anarchy incited by the invasion, new trends and
concepts were born and proliferated under the cover of parties that rapidly permeated the
country, using the media to promote their ideas and programmes and broaden the scope of their
activities in the new environment. The close involvement of all the media in the ideological
conflicts of political movements is a problem that began in 2003 and still exists today. It takes
the form of an open information war being waged between opposing media outlets and political
parties without regard for professional principles or procedures that should be observed in any
attempt to influence public opinion.123
Continued violence by the media will cause just as much devastation to the state as
political and economic violence do. The effect is detrimental to a society that is trying to recover
from multiple wars. I believe that the “sectarian violence” seen in the early 2010s was not
sectarianism, rather extremists and rogue militants taking advantage of the unstable state. The
divided and weak climate that the coalition left Iraq with allowed extremists to take advantage of
the “sectarian tensions,” and launch attacks to further pursue their goals of gaining influence.
Furthermore, political tensions were exacerbated by media practices. Blaming the war and the
continued violence that still exists today on sectarianism is an easy excuse, but in order to bring
Iraq out of the violence, actual government reforms and policies have to be implemented to its
media and security sectors.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Violence is intrinsically intertwined with Iraq’s history and future. State and non-state
institutions have used all forms of violence for power and control. These institutions have also
exploited the underlying structures of inequality for their own gains. Using violence to shape the
country’s society has a detrimental effect on the stability of Iraq, and Iraqis continue to feel the
effects of it.
Many individuals, countries, and institutions are responsible for the scale of violence
brought upon Iraq and its people. The three events that I covered were major creators and
products of violence in Iraq. The economic sanctions were brought about by Saddam’s decision
to invade Kuwait. The Faith Campaign was created to appease Iraqis’ attitudes towards the
regime during the sanctions. The violent media climate was created by war and led to more
“war.” There are many more instances of violence throughout Iraq’s history. I briefly touched on
these in Chapter 2, but violence in Iraq’s history goes back even further than that.
Through my research, I found that Iraq’s government and international governments are
mostly to blame for the violence. While a government monopoly on violence is the case for most
states, Iraq is different because of how violence continues to evolve over decades through new
regimes and wars. Iraq’s leaders continue to incite violence through inadequate governing, while
international governments planted the seed for this to continue for years to come. Violence in
Iraq will very likely continue to delegitimize the government, weaken the economy, and
challenge Iraqi national identity until institutional reforms are implemented and instigators of
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violence - whether they are individuals or the state - are held responsible. The oversimplification
of the challenges facing Iraq is detrimental to its stability as a post-war state.
While researching, I found it very difficult to find other scholars that shared my opinion
that violence in Iraq is not rooted in sectarianism. This explanation just seems to be too
convenient and easy, and I think that the problem lies deeper. It was important to me to
emphasize this throughout my paper because I wanted to contribute to the literature that proves
the problem lies elsewhere. While sectarianism does play a part in life in Iraq, it is not the only
reason. Outside governments and Iraqi institutions have tried to entrench the sectarian narrative
to every problem facing Iraq.
I think this can be seen most clearly through Galtung’s lenses of segmentation,
marginalization, and fragmentation. By definition, segmentation is when the underdog has only a
partial idea of what is happening. Marginalization keeps the underdogs on the outside, while
fragmentation keeps the underdogs away from each other. In each case that I covered, it seems
that when the government implemented one of these methods, it almost erased any sectarian
differences to unite the general population against the government, thus enforcing the “us versus
them” idea that results from any form of violence.
The only case that may challenge this is Iraq’s media and the climate it operated in after
around 2007. I agree that this was a civil war by definition, but I think that the American
Coalition’s processes of “state building” and historically dividing policies implemented by Iraq’s
past governments for their own gain contributed more to the civil fall out than sectarian
differences between civilians.
As the Salafi-jihadi threat continues to be one of the biggest challenges in the region, it is
important for Iraq to be able to depend on internal infrastructure to secure its stability, rather than
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rely on outside aid. External powers have already harmed the state too much in the past, and
Iraq’s ability to face this challenge on its own will greatly contribute to the legitimacy of its
government. If Iraq’s government is unable to deal with this threat, it will leave the population
vulnerable to even more violence and the government impressionable to outside powers.
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